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I. INTRODUCTION
It has been said that the dispute resolution system is the heart of the World
Trade Organization (WTO).' If this is the case, the lack of participation in the
process by some members may prove dire to the long-term credibility and
functionality of the system as a whole. Even though the common law system of
stare decisis does not exist to the same extent within the WTO as it does in the
western legal tradition, past decisions do serve as guideposts for reference as the
• • 2
panels and appellate bodies make decisions. The virtual absence of some
* J.D., University of the Pacific, University of the Pacific, May 2009; B.A., Anthropology, Bates
College 1998.
1. See Anna Lanoszka, The Promises of Multilateralism and the Hazards of 'Single Understanding': The
Breakdown of Decision Making Within the WTO, 16 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 655, 669 (2008) (explaining that the
dispute resolution system of the WTO is often called the WTO's crown jewel).
2. See generally Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis and International Trade Law (Part One of a
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developing countries as complainants to a dispute may mean that their interests
are not represented in the development of the jurisprudence of the world's
premier international dispute resolution system.' "The lack of participation by
large sections of the WTO membership, such as African countries, is a danger to
the long-term 'predictability' function of the WTO and could undermine the
usefulness of the entire process eventually. It is therefore in the interests of all
WTO members to work towards resolving the problems that prevent them from
making use of the system when they need to."' 4 In other words, the WTO dispute
settlement system benefits when least developed countries can enforce their
rights as effectively and reliably as developed country members. For example,
during negotiations, a developing country member may be more inclined to make
certain concessions when it trusts that a forum exists that will resolve a dispute
regarding those concessions as well as compel any reciprocal concessions! In
turn, when one member trusts that it will be able to enforce its rights, in the end
the other members profit.
This article addresses the procedural concerns within the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU) and their effect on the ability of developing country
members to assert their rights. The article argues that although the dispute
settlement system is a step in the right direction in addressing the needs of
developing countries, more steps should be taken. In Part II, this article provides
specific examples of procedural flaws in the in the DSU as it relates to
developing countries. Part III examines solutions that have been proposed to
increase accessibility to the dispute settlement system and considers the benefits
and drawbacks of each. Part III also argues for a reform to the Panel system and
to the use of amicus briefs. It further proposes the creation of a litigation support
team, increased third-party rights, and the expansion of available remedies. Part
IV concludes that although no one solution is perfect, many viable options exist
that will improve the current dispute settlement system.6
Trilogy), 14 AM. U. INT'L. L. REV. 845 (1999) (arguing that the WTO functions increasingly like an American
court in the Appellate Body's use of precedent).
3. Victor Mosoti, Africa in the First Decade of WTO Dispute Settlement, 9 J. INT'L ECON. L. 427, 432
(2006).
4. Id.
5. See Niall Meagher, Representing Developing Countries in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings, in
WTO LAW AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 213, 214-15 (George A. Bermann & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2007).
6. Although differences exist in middle income countries' access to the DSU as compared to least
developed countries, that topic is beyond the scope of this article. However, the World Bank provides a country
classification table according to the following categories: low income, lower middle income, upper income, and
high income. See World Bank List of Economies, July 2008, http://siteresources.worldbank.orgDATA
STATISTICS/Resources/CLASS.XLS.
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II. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE DSU FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
A. Procedural Inadequacies
Many members have expressed frustration at the DSU's procedures and its
inability to address developing countries' needs. Their complaints range from
frustration with the ever-growing complexity of the system, to disagreement over
whether organizations who are not parties to the dispute should be permitted to
provide amicus briefs to the decision-making body. Further complicating matters
is the fact that developing country members sometimes disagree about the
appropriate approach for solving the perceived power imbalance, leaving some
dissatisfied with the WTO's attempts to level the playing field!
1. The Dispute Over Amicus Briefs
Although developing countries are in general agreement on the use of
unsolicited amicus briefs for use by the Panel and Appellate Body, it is a source
of contention among some developing countries.9 The conflict arises in part
because amicus briefs are viewed by some developing countries as another effort
by rich nations to restrain their ability to participate effectively in the market. '0
For example, it may frustrate a developing country member if a non-
governmental organization (NGO) who is not involved in a particular dispute
presents unsolicited information to influence the judges' opinion about an issue
that is contrary to the developing country's position. This is especially true when
a brief argues for added regulations that will be expensive or beyond that
member's present technological capability. For developing countries, the choice
may be between whether to comply or to incur higher tariffs on their goods.
Therefore, the developing countries often automatically believe that the interests
of NGOs will be contrary to their interests. When developed nations and wealthy
private organizations present arguments in an effort to influence the direction of
international law through amicus briefs, developing countries may feel bullied.
This is particularly so if that member lacks the financial and legal resources to
fully articulate and present competing arguments." As a result, the question for
7. See C.L. Lim, The Amicus Brief Issue at the WTO, 4 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 85 (2005) (discussing the
role non-governmental organizations play in WTO panel decisions); see also Victor Mosoti, In Our Image, Not
Theirs: Damages as an Antidote to the Remedial Deficiencies in the WTO Dispute Settlement Process; A View
from Sub-Saharan Africa, 19 B.U. INT'L L.J. 231 (2001) (arguing that the DSU is not suited for countries with
weaker economies).
8. See Raj Bhala, The Bananas War, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 839 (describing the complicated tensions
between developing countries involved in the Bananas dispute).
9. Mosoti, supra note 3, at 438.
10. Maura B. Jeffords, Turning the Protester into a Partner for Development: The Need for Effective
Consultation Between the WTO & NGOs, BROOK. J. INT'L L. 937, 964-65 (2003).
11. Id.; Steve Chamovitz, Opening the WTO to Nongovernmental Interests, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L. J.
173, 211 (2000) (explaining that NGOs seek to submit an amicus brief to a panel hoping that it will foster the
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developing countries becomes whether there is really any choice at all in the
absence of meaningful choice.
On the other hand, NGOs argue for their ability to present amicus briefs to
the Panel and Appellate Bodies as a way to offer essential information on issues
that might have been excluded by the parties to the dispute.' 2 The goal from the
NGOs' perspective is not necessarily to stand in the way of development, but to
provide the decision-makers with a broader picture of competing concerns."
NGOs argue that, like many court systems, the WTO copes with overworked
judges and staff who have political biases, little time to do extra research, and
litigation tactics that intentionally omit important information relevant to areas of
broad public interest. 14
The Panel addressed the question of whether to allow amicus briefs in the
Shrimp-Turtle case. 5 There, the Panel was asked to decide specifically whether
Article 13 of the DSU permitted amicus briefs. 6 Article 13 specifically states that
the Panel has the right to seek information in making its decision on a particular
matter.'7 The developing countries opposed the use of amicus briefs by focusing
on the word seek to argue that NGOs may not present information to the Panel if
it was not requested by the Panel first.'8 The Panel concluded that accepting non-
requested information from non-governmental sources would be inconsistent
with the DSU. 9 However, the Panel also noted that it was the usual practice for
parties to introduce information relevant to support their case. Therefore, if a
party to the dispute wanted to include submissions from non-governmental
organizations as part of their own submissions, they were free to do so.20
On appeal, the Appellate Body noted that the DSU accords the Panel with
"ample and extensive authority to undertake and to control the process by which
it informs itself both of the relevant facts of the dispute and of the legal norms
and principles applicable to such facts.,, 2' Based on this reasoning, it expanded
the Panel decision by stating that the Panel was authorized to accept amicus
creation of international law. Such law then becomes 'the ammunition that NGOs use to brow-beat national
governments.' This makes it difficult for governments to exercise 'sovereignty against NGO-promoted public
outcries').
12. See generally Jeffords, supra note 10 (arguing that non-state actors should have the opportunity to
voice their concerns within to the WTO).
13. Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Judicial
Proceedings, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 611, 616 (1994).
14. Id.
15. Panel Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/
DS58/R (May 15, 1998).
16. See id 7.7.
17. Id. 17.8.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Appellate Body Report, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
106, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998).
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briefs not only from parties to the dispute, but directly from the non-
governmental organizations as well .
Developing countries parted ways on the issue when Morocco, a WTO
member but not a party to the dispute, presented its own amicus brief 2 The novel
question presented in this situation then was whether a WTO member not a party
to the dispute could submit its own amicus brief. Peru opposed Morocco's
position and argued that this was a violation of the DSU.24 The Appellate Body
agreed with Morocco and found that it would not make sense to treat non-
members more favorably than members.25 In other words, if the WTO allows
non-members to submit amicus briefs, then certainly members should be allowed
to do So.26
2. Inadequate Resources and Institutional Capacity
A deficiency of resources as well as a lack of institutional capacity are
27additional obstacles to effective participation in the dispute settlement process.
For example, when a member does not fully staff its mission in Geneva, it may
not learn about issues that will affect its interests. In turn, this member is not able
to take part in consultations that lead to the consensus process. This is
particularly debilitating considering that the consultations and the consensus
process form the basis of the WTO decision-making system.28 And although the
number of meetings to address these increasingly complex issues has increased,
some developing countries have not been able to increase their mission sizes in
Geneva-if they have established a mission at all. 29 As a result, developing
countries in such a situation are losing the opportunity to speak up in order to
protect their interests on a given issue.3°
As rules and issues grow in complexity, a lack of legal expertise also places
developing countries at a disadvantage because of their inability to independently
maneuver through the DSU.3" Part of the problem is the cost of legal
22. Id. 1 107-08.
23. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Trade Description of Sardines, it 161-65,
WT/DS23 l/AB/R (Oct. 23, 2002).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. CONSTANTINE MICHALOPOULOS, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO 152-175 (Palgrave
MacMillan 2001).
28. See id.
29. See id.; Mosoti, supra note 3, at 442 (stating that most African countries have only only one or two
overburdened trade officials stationed in Geneva who do not have a great focus on dispute resolution).
30. See generally Mosoti, supra note 3, at 452 (concluding that African countries "still need to improve
their participation in the system, particularly because it is not only about disputes but also because it is an
evolving body of international economic law principles, that are steadily being shaped by WTO members that
are active participants").
31. Id. at 442.
2009 / Procedural Inequities within the WTO Dispute Settlement System
representation. 32 When faced with a shortage of funds for basic infrastructural
necessities within the country, the option to litigate may seem daunting, if not
impossible.3 3 Further crippling their ability to participate is the fact that
developing countries often do not have sufficient in-country WTO trained
lawyers with enough experience to litigate a particular issue, nor the resources to
hire outside counsel. 3' While members who regularly take part in litigation
continually gain invaluable experience, those who remain uninvolved do not.
This absence only widens the gap in these members' knowledge and expertise of
35the dispute settlement process.
The need for legal support during a dispute did not go unrecognized by the
WTO. The DSU states that members are to be offered legal support while
involved in the dispute settlement system under Articles 27.2 and 27.3.36
Unfortunately, the WTO Secretariat has only hired two part-time experts and two
junior staff who offer support and oddly, the DSU provides assistance only in the
situation where a member participates as a respondent.37 As a result, it is not
surprising that so few developing countries act as individual complainants to a
dispute, especially against a developed country.38
3. Developing Countries' Use of Outside Counsel
In light of the complexity of the issues and potential time and resources
required to adequately address them, the support provided to developing
countries through the WTO itself is insufficient to place them on equal footing
with developed country members. As a result, developing countries may require
the assistance of outside counsel to aid them wade through the ever-increasing
intricacy of the rules.39
The Bananas case was the first to address the issue of hiring outside counsel.
In that case, the complainants objected to the presence of private lawyers at Panel
meetings.40 The Panel considered four factors in deciding against allowing
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Carrie P. Smith, Patenting Life: The Potential and the Pitfalls of Using the WTO to Globalize
Intellectual Property Rights, 26 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 143, 168 (2000).
37. MOHAMMAD TANZIMUDDIN KHAN, WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: A NEOREALIST CRITIQUE 40 (Bliss Papers 2004).
38. See Hansel T. Pham, Developing Countries and the WTO: The Need for More Mediation in the DSU,
9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 331, 348-49 (2004) (explaining that the legal expert provided by the Secretariat may
only assist a developing country in a way that will not compromise the impartiality of the Secretariat); Meagher,
supra note 5 (discussing the development, benefits and limitations of the Advisory Center on WTO Law
(ACWL)).
39. KHAN, supra note 37 (noting that legal expertise is required for a country to identify violations of
WTO rules or impairing practices).
40. Panel Report, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
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outside counsel at these meetings: (1) it had been past practice in GATT and
WTO dispute settlement proceedings not to admit private lawyers to panel
meetings if any party objected to their presence; (2) the working procedures of
the Panel expressed the expectation that only members of governments would be
present at Panel meetings; (3) given that private lawyers may not be subject to
disciplinary rules such as those applied to members of governments, their
presence in Panel meetings could give rise to concerns about breaches of
confidentiality; and (4) the Panel was concerned about whether the presence of
private lawyers would change the intergovernmental character of WTO dispute
settlement proceedings.4' In addition, concerns about bringing in large western-
style law firms may have been present in the sense that their involvement would
lead to excessive adversarial zeal, biased processes in favor of western-developed
common law style litigation, and the resulting elevated costs that accompany
western-style litigation. 2
On appeal, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel in a decision favorable to
developing country members. 43 For example, some may not have adequate in-
country counsel with enough WTO litigation experience, and without adequate
counsel, a member may effectively be prevented from bringing a claim at all.4
However, the Appellate Body in Bananas took into consideration the policy
concerns of prohibiting private counsel to developing countries and altered the
Panel's ruling on the matter in favor of the complainants.45 In a victory for the
respondents, the Appellate Body explained that there was nothing in the
Agreements or Working Procedures that prevented the use of private counsel.4 6 It
further noted that governments have the ability to hire a private entity to
represent their cause. 47 They simply call the private entity a paid public servant
once hired by the government.
48
Bananas, 7.10, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM/HND, WT/DS27/R/MEX, WT/DS27/RJUSA (Sept. 25,
1997) [hereinafter Panel Report - Bananas].
41. Id. 7.11 (f).
42. Jeffrey Waincymer, Transparency of Dispute Settlement Within the World Trade Organization, 24
MELB. U. L. REV. 797, 819 (2000) (arguing that there are many procedural uncertainties in the dispute
settlement process which have an adverse impact on transparency and could be remedied by allowing private
party rights of standing in WTO dispute settlement).
43. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution
of Bananas, 147, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sep. 9, 1997) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report - Bananas].
44. Id. "[T]he disparity in the size and expertise of VTO Missions in Geneva, coupled with the role of
governmental counsel for many of the larger Members, suggests that smaller developing countries which feel
unable to best present their own cases should have the right to hire whatever staff they feel are appropriate to
present the relevant arguments." Waincymer, supra note 42.
45. Appellate Body Report - Bananas, supra note 43, 12.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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4. Panel System and Dissenting Opinions
Another procedural concern is whether the DSU is a development-friendly
system.49 The paucity of representatives from LDCs to act as judges on panels
and as Appellate Body members presents another impediment to their
participation in the dispute settlement process. ° Many least developed countries
complain that they have had few members offering guidance as panelists or
Appellate Body members." African members, in particular, have had little
participation in the panel system. 2 As stated by the African Group in a proposal
regarding its role in dispute settlement, "[there is] a still unbalanced
representation of Africa on the panels and the Appellate body. A balanced
geographical representation will assist in promoting a balanced DS that reflects
the various backgrounds and inherent concerns of the entire WTO
Membership."53
However, simply because a panelist is from a developing country does not
automatically suggest that this panelist will be sympathetic to the concerns of the
developing country that is a party to the dispute. However, it does make sense to
attempt to balance leaders on the Panel and Appellate Body by including judges
from all regions who can bring a variety of backgrounds and perspectives. A
deciding body made primarily of European and U.S. members would present at
least an outwardly skewed perspective.
5 4
A related concern is that currently the dissenting opinions are not included in
the decisions." The concern here is that an opposing viewpoint may shed light on
important issues and approaches to problems that currently go unheard.56 Some
developing countries argue that the increased cost of requiring each member of
the panel to submit an opinion is warranted because of the positive input for the
development of WTO jurisprudence.5 This argument makes sense not just in
light of issues pertaining to developing countries, but as a way to strengthen the
development of WTO jurisprudence generally.58
49. Mosoti, supra note 3, at 442.
50. Id. at 440.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 441.
54. See Petko D. Kantchevski, Note and Comment, The Differences Between the Panel Procedures of
the GATT and the WTO: The Role of GAT and WTO Panels in Trade Dispute Settlement, 3 BYU INT'L L. &
MGMT. REV. 79, 98 (2006) (explaining the Panel selection process).
55. Lawrence D. Roberts, Beyond Notions of Diplomacy and Legalism: Building a Just Mechanism for
WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 AM. Bus. L.J. 511, 542-45 (2003) (discussing the effect of an anonymous panel
and the lack of dissenting opinions in the current dispute resolution system).
56. Id. at 542.
57. Id. at 544.
58. Id.
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5. Third-party Rights
The diminutive rights allotted to third parties to a dispute have proved
disadvantageous to developing countries as well.59 Although the ability to
participate as a third-party allows some voice for countries who otherwise could
not afford to be included at all, third-parties do not have the same rights as the
principal complainants do.6 As a result, their voice is present, but muffled. This
problem was particularly apparent in the Bananas case because all of the African
countries on the respondent side were involved as third parties, whereas the only
principal party was the European Communities (EC). 6' The African countries
responded to the situation by requesting "enhanced third-party rights. 62 The
panel in this case ruled that "[m]embers of governments of third parties would be
permitted to observe the second substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties,
and would have the opportunity to make a brief statement during the second
meeting," but denied further participatory rights.63
Generally, third-party rights are limited to the minimum guarantees granted
under Article 10 and Appendix 3 of the DSU. 4 The issue was also addressed in a
case brought by India against the EC regarding the conditions for granting tariff
preferences to developing countries . In that case, because "their substantial
interest is of special importance to the dispute, 66 the eleven third-party members
requested to the ability to "attend all the Panel meetings, to present their points of
view at such meetings, receive copies of all submissions to the Panel, to make
59. Panel Report - Bananas, supra note 40, 1 7.51.
60. Id.
61. Id. V.1.
62. Id. V.12.
63. Id. 7.8.
64. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2 of the
WTO, Article 10: Third Parties, Apr. 15, 1994, http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu_e/dsue.html
[hereinafter DSU]. The Dispute Settlement Understanding, Article 10, lists the rights of third parties as follows:
I. The interests of the parties to a dispute and those of other Members under a covered
agreement at issue in the dispute shall be fully taken into account during the panel process. 2.
Any Member having a substantial interest in a matter before a panel and having notified its
interest to the DSB (referred to in this Understanding as a "third party") shall have an
opportunity to be heard by the panel and to make written submissions to the panel. These
submissions shall also be given to the parties to the dispute and shall be reflected in the panel
report. 3. Third parties shall receive the submissions of the parties to the dispute to the first
meeting of the panel. 4. If a third party considers that a measure already the subject of a panel
proceeding nullifies or impairs benefits accruing to it under any covered agreement, that
Member may have recourse to normal dispute settlement procedures under this Understanding.
Such a dispute shall be referred to the original panel wherever possible.
Id.
65. Panel Report, European Communities-Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to
Developing Countries, WT/DS246/R (Dec. 1, 2003).
66. Id. 1.8, Annex A I (Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela argued that the measure at issue determined the conditions of access
of their exports to the European market as beneficiaries of the tariff preferences scheme).
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submissions to the Panel at its second meeting, to review the draft summary of
arguments in the descriptive part of the Panel report., 67 Likening the situation to
Bananas, the Panel noted the economic impact of the preference programmes on
third-party developing countries. In its discretion, the Panel granted enhanced
rights to observe the first substantive meeting with the parties, receive the second
submissions of the parties, observe the second substantive meeting with the
parties, make a brief statement during the second substantive meeting with the
parties, and review the summary of their respective arguments in the draft
61descriptive part of the panel report. Currently, "enhanced third party rights" are
allowed in the discretion of the panel as long as the enhanced rights are
69
consistent with the DSU and due process.
While these changes are an improvement on the rights generally granted to
third parties under the DSU, they are by no means as substantial as the rights of
members who have the funding and expertise to maintain active involvement as
complainants, particularly in Bananas where further participatory rights were
denied. Additionally, third parties do not have the same rights to remedies when
they prevail in a dispute. For example, they do not have the option to retaliate
against the losing party in the case of non-compliance with a ruling.0
6. Inadequate Remedies
One of the greatest barriers to developing countries ability to participate
effectively in the dispute settlement system is the problem of non-compliance.'
The problem exists because sometimes it may be more efficient for a developing
country to choose to breach its obligations and face retaliatory measures than to
bring itself into compliance with WTO policy.72 Part of the problem under the
73DSU, as under GATT procedure, is that the WTO lacks enforcement powers.
When a Panel finds for one of the parties, the only authority it has is to offer
toothless recommendations to the offending member to bring itself into
compliance.74 As a result, the offending nation is free to choose whether the
67. Id.
68. Id. at Annex A, 8.
69. Appellate Body Report, United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations," 243
WT/DS 108/AB/RW (Jan. 14, 2002).
70. Sonia E. Rolland, Developing Country Coalitions at the WTO: In Search of Legal Support, 48
HARV. INT'L L.J. 483, 543 (2007).
71. Joel P. Trachtman, The WTO Cathedral, 43 STAN. J. INT'L L. 127, 128 (explaining the reasons why
developing countries that win a lawsuit at the WTO may find that the remedies are ineffective or inadequate).
72. See generally Carolyn B. Gleason & Pamela D. Walther, The WTO Dispute Settlement
Implementation Procedures: A System in Need of Reform, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 709 (2000) (discussing
problems that have arisen with WTO non-compliance procedures and urging reform to resolve disagreements
over these procedures).
73. KHAN, supra note 37, at 43-44.
74. See generally Gleason & Walther, supra note 72, at 728 (noting that the current procedures have
been ineffective in producing European compliance with WTO rulings in modest commercial disputes).
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recommendation is in its best interest or not.5 If the only result will be a decision
in their favor, with no ability to take action, when faced with the choice of
whether to use limited resources to bring a suit, developing countries are less
likely to attempt to enforce their rights.76
The Antigua case illustrates the problem.77 In that case, the Panel was asked
whether legislation creating a "total prohibition" by the U.S. on cross-border
supply of gambling and betting services provided by Antigua was
discriminatory. 7' Antigua, a relatively small island nation whose economy has
largely been supported by online gambling and betting, was negatively impacted
by the U.S. legislation.79 As a result, Antigua claimed the new legislation violated
the U.S.'s international trade agreements.80 Antigua sought the aid of the WTO in
an attempt to force the U.S. to comply with its obligations under the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). The Appellate Body ultimately sided
with Antigua and found that the U.S. prohibition did, in fact, violate its GATS
agreements since the U.S. allowed other forms of online gambling.8' Further, the
Appellate Body stated that the U.S. must modify the legislation to avoid
inconsistencies with its international obligations. 2 The U.S., however, refused to
comply claiming that the laws were necessary to protect the public morals and
order.8 3 Antigua, as the winning party, had the right to try to force compliance
through retaliation, and it has considered suspension of intellectual property
protection. 84 However, the economic effect on a country as large as the U.S.
85
would likely be negligible. Therefore, despite the favorable outcome, Antigua
could do little to enforce the ruling. 6
75. Id.
76. KHAN, supra note 37, at 43. ("[Tlhe DSU is recognized to be the heart of legalist model of dispute
settlement procedures as it has eliminated the legal provisions of the GAT-T that offered the dominant countries
with the scope of exercising their political and economic influence. However, in granting such recognition, the
existence of power paradox in the WTO regime is often overlooked. Power paradox, in fact, emanates from the
fact that the WTO is an intergovernmental organization and it still requires Member states' economic power and
political influence to ensure implementation and compliance of panel ruling.").
77. Panel Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting
Services, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004) [hereinafter Panel Report, United States-Gambling].
78. Id. 3.74.
79. See id. 3.2, 3.74.
80. See id. 3.28-3.39
81. Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross Border Supply of Gambling
and Betting Services, 'n 362-72, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005).
82. Id. 374.
83. Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, A Pirate of the Caribbean? The Attractions of Suspending TRIPS
Obligations, II J. INT'L ECON. L. 313, 317 (2008).
84. Id. at 314.
85. Id. at 332.
86. See id.; Joseph E. Stiglitz, Regulating Multinational Corporations: Towards Principles of Cross-
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It is important to note that without the support of the DSU, Antigua would
have had little recourse on its own in terms of bilateral negotiations with the
U.S.87 However, a positive ruling does little good if it cannot be enforced. Such
an outcome suggests that nations like Antigua cannot rely on the dispute
settlement process to protect its rights when entering into trade agreements.
Alternatively, it is arguable that the U.S. should not be required to come into
compliance with a ruling that is morally unacceptable to its citizens."
A related concern of developing countries is that they may fear that any
attempts at retaliation will only worsen their situation. For example, if one
member receives aid from another member, the donee of the aid might abstain
from enforcing a WTO ruling for fear that the support could be withdrawn.
Further, the donee member may fear that whatever retaliation it imposes will be
ineffective and only create tension with the donor country.
Even when retaliation is a viable option, the offending country may prevent a
member for making use of this remedy in a timely manner. The reason is that
except for the status reports required every six months under Article 21, the Panel
may not regulate a specific time frame within which the offending country must
come into full compliance. Although the timeframe for compliance must be
"reasonable", it is still unclear what this term means and whose view of
reasonable will apply.9' As a result, the lack of specificity can create conflicts for
developing countries in that the offending nation may manipulate the system in
order to avoid compliance. 92
87. See generally Caley Ross, David Gambles to Slay Goliath and Barely Lives to Tell the Tale: Antigua
v. United States, 11 GAMING L. REV. 674 (2007) (in recounting the U.S.-Antigua dispute, the author refers to
Antigua as "David" and the United States as "Goliath" in the article title).
88. See Panel Report, United States-Gambling, supra note 77 (the Panel found that the challenged
measures were designed to protect public morals, public order, and secure compliance with other WTO-
consistent laws); Warren F. Schwartz & Alan 0. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute
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breach within the WTO dispute settlement process using the economic theory of contract remedies); but see
Thomas Sebastian, World Trade Organization Remedies and the Assessment of Proportionality: Equivalence
and Appropriateness, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 337, 375 (noting that Sykes and Schwartz argue that "the function of
the WTO remedial regime is to provide appropriate incentives so that WTO Members behave in a manner that
maximizes joint welfare ... Sykes and Schwartz understand welfare to mean political welfare rather than the
aggregate welfare levels of citizens of AITO Member states.").
89. Ji Li, From "See You in Court!" to "See You in Geneva!": An Empirical Study of the Role of Social
Norms in International Trade Dispute Resolution, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 485, 488-89 (2007).
90. See generally Shin-yi Peng, How Much Time is Reasonable?-The Arbitral Decisions Under Article
21.3(C) of the DSU, 26 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 323, 324 (2008) (stating that although "justice delayed is better
than justice denied, the delay must still be reasonable).
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92. Id.; see C. O'Neal Taylor, Impossible Cases: Lessons from the First Decade of WTO Dispute
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III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. Amicus Briefs
The use of amicus briefs may prove beneficial to developing countries when
attention is also given to their particular needs. Currently, the Panel has the
discretion on whether to accept or reject amicus briefs. Developing countries
continue to oppose this practice because they fear that wealthy organizations will
be employed to provide information supporting the use of more trade limitations
on them than under current WTO law.93 As such, while development should be
one focus of the WTO, this goal does not necessarily need to take place at the
cost of silencing other interests, such as environmental or labor issues, which
may be voiced through amicus briefs. However, modifications to the use the
briefs should be considered.
First, NGOs should be required to include alternative solutions to the
problem they are presenting in their amicus briefs. These alternatives should
address the economic and social situations of developing countries when making
proposals for inclusion into international law. Less costly solutions should be
considered along with technological support when needed. Staged compliance
dates should be included as an option. Such a requirement may enable
developing country members to feel less resistance to amicus briefs if their
specific needs are addressed by NGOs. In the end, it may be to the long-term
benefit of developing countries to take the information included in the brief into
consideration .94
B. High Cost of Litigation and Institutional Capacity
The DSU should be made more accessible to developing countries by
lowering their litigation costs and through litigation support. Some members
have suggested the creation of a fund to help defray costs.95 Such financial
support could also be used to fund a special team of lawyers whose mission it is
to assist developing countries litigate.96 The development of this team would help
solve the problem of inaccessibility of litigation resulting from the increasing
complexity of the law. Although the fund could be implemented in a variety of97
ways, one option would be to include a mandatory fee that goes toward
93. Shoaib A. Ghias, International Judicial Lawmaking: A Theoretical and Political Analysis of the
WTO Appellate Body, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 534, 551 (2006).
94. See Charnovitz, supra note 11, at 965-66.
95. Mosoti, supra note 3, at 442.
96. Id.
97. Another option is to include a voluntary fund. However, considering that some of the WTOs
wealthiest members have declined to support the ACWL, it is likely that they would refuse to voluntarily
support a similar program provided by the WTO itself. See Timothy Stostad, Trappings of Legality:
Judicialization of Dispute Settlement in the WTO, and its Impact on Developing Countries, 39 CORNELL INT'L
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litigation costs for developing countries in the membership dues for developed
countries. 9'
There may be some concern as to why developed countries should help
provide litigation support to developing countries when it may not be in their best
interest to do so. However, if it is a principle of the WTO to provide an equitable
and mutually acceptable resolution to a dispute, attempts should be made to
balance access to funds for litigation.99 The system as a whole is disserved when
some developing countries are largely absent from disputes.'0° Their absence
impedes the development of a more predictable body of law from which to
draw.' °' Because predictability is in all members' interest, those with greater
economic capacity should be required to provide financial support as well.
C. Panel System Reform
As previously mentioned, a common concern regarding the panel system is
that it is inherently biased in favor of developed nations. °2 A panel system that
includes significantly fewer panelists from developing countries may not
adequately reflect the variety of perspectives and methods of addressing the
issues that are raised in trade disputes. This disparity in numbers is particularly
questionable when the majority of member nations are developing countries.
Even though the inclusion of at least one panelist from the parties to a
dispute may not protect developing countries interests by itself, it is an important
step in the right direction. Such a requirement would reflect the WTO's
commitment to meet the variety of needs of its members and in turn, potentially
increase confidence in the system. Furthermore, it might often be the case that
the developing country panelist could provide a fresh perspective on an issue.
This new perspective, even if it departs from other panelists' views, could be
helpful in the development of WTO jurisprudence. This is even more reason to
include a written dissent.
L.J. 811, 840 (2006). Other options include representation on a pro-bono basis by private law firms or by non-
governmental organizations with a particular interest in developing countries. See Chad P. Bown, Comment on
Niall Meagher's "Representing Developing Countries in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings," in WTO LAW
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 227, 232 (George A. Bermand & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2007).
98. See generally Stostad, supra note 97 (explaining that the WTO should provide legal assistance and
outright advocacy).
99. World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes, http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/whatis_eltif-e/displ-e.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2009).
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D. Third-Party Rights
Many countries chose to participate in a dispute as third parties because they
are not sufficiently experienced with the WTO litigation process and because
they simply do not have the resources to participate as primary complainants.
However, the problem of diminished rights allotted to countries who act as third
parties could potentially be solved by the previously mentioned fund for
litigation support. If a country chooses to become a third party because of a lack
of money for litigation, and the inability to adequately represent themselves as a
complainant, then the creation of a support fund to defray these costs reduces the
need to rethink third-party rights.
In the absence of such a fund, the DSU should provide a version of special
and differential treatment for developing countries who act as third-parties. A
version of this has been done by leaving the decision on whether to enhance
third-party rights to the discretion to the Panel.'03 However, rather than leaving it
entirely to a discretionary decision, a formalized procedure for the granting of
such preferences would offer more predictability to members who may consider
whether, and what role, to take part in a dispute.
E. Collective Retaliation
For retaliation to be an effective remedy, the complainant nation must have
the ability to suspend equivalent concessions to the level of nullification or
impairment. '°4 Under the DSU, the ultimate sanction against a non-complying
member is trade retaliation through suspension of equivalent concessions. '°5
However, as discussed previously, some countries may not have the economic
ability to suspend equivalent concessions. So far there is not a single situation
where countermeasures to induce compliance have been imposed on a developed
member by a developing country member.' 6 Included in the list of Ten Common
Misunderstandings about the WTO includes a section entitled "Weaker countries
do have a choice, they are NOT forced to join the WTO." Also in this section is
an explanation of the benefits of membership. "By joining the WTO, even a
small country automatically enjoys the benefits that all WTO Members grant to
each other. And small countries have won dispute cases against rich countries -
103. Panel Report, European Communities-Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to
Developing Countries, WT/DS246/R (Dec. 1, 2003).
104. DSU, supra note 64, art. 22, 4; see Kyle Bagwell et al., Considering Remedies: Panel Discussion,
in THE WTO: GOVERNANCE, DISPUTE SETrLEMENT, AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 817, 829 (Merit E. Janow et
al. eds., Juris Publishing 2008) (during a panel discussion, one panelist likened the necessity of painful
retaliatory measures to a burr under the saddle in order to be effective, and notes that retroactive measures
should be considered).
105. DSU, supra note 64, art. 2, 1.
106. Kyle Bagwell et al., The Case for Tradable Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement 14 (World Bank
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they would not have been able to do so outside the WTO."'O' The problem with
this enthusiastic statement is that often, the win is in name only.
The concept of collective retaliation'0 8 has been proposed as a means of
offering developing countries the ability to better enforce their rights under the
DSU.'09 The value to a developing country to invoke collective retaliation is
obvious-the concept as proposed states that "all or some" WTO members
would be allowed to retaliate against the offending country in an effort to bring
about compliance. "o As a result, in a case where a developing country succeeded
in a claim, collective retaliation would be available automatically, as a matter of
special and differential treatment."'
Critics of the proposal argue that collective retaliation is counter to the
primary goals of the WTO in that it is trade destructive rather than trade
creative." 2 In other words, the WTO was organized to liberalize trade, but
expanding the injured member's remedy to countries who were not originally
involved only creates more protectionist policies. ' As a result, there is a
possibility of increased litigation because of greater involvement in disputes, and
retaliating members who were not the original parties to the dispute will have
incentive to elect a retaliation plan that focuses on their protectionist groups.114
This argument suggests that the end result is likely to be greater protectionism
across the board.
Furthermore, collective retaliation may defeat the purpose of dispute
settlement when economic tensions are spread to other parties. The concern is
that the problem would simply escalate rather than result in a settlement. "5 One
apprehension is that it is impossible to predict the outcome of such a severe
remedy. Likening collective retaliation to the events leading up to World War
One, one scholar stated:
The consequence would be to turn a major bilateral dispute into a major
trial for the multilateral system not entirely unlike the unintended events
which unfolded in August 1914 following the assassination of an
107. World Trade Organization, The 10 Misunderstandings, http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/
whatise/10mise/10m09_- e.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2009).
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319, 338-39 (2008) (arguing that collective retaliation may increase global trade barriers while not inducing
compliance by scofflaw states).
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114. Id.at321-22.
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Austrian archduke, although on a less grand scale. This concern is
especially great if the offending Member believes that it has been
unjustly found to be non-compliant with WTO policy."16
However, in the situation where a developed country understands that if it
chooses to breach its obligations, it faces the potential for retaliation not just from
one undeveloped country, but possibly all other WTO members. This may cause
that country to reconsider coming into compliance, as the idea of an efficient
breach may indeed appear less efficient when faced with possibility of expanded
retaliation."7 For example, the U.S. may reassess its choice of noncompliance in
the case against Antigua if faced with retaliation from several members.
Proponents of the idea of efficient breach may disagree with such a drastic
measure."8 Certainly, the potential for increased global level of trade barriers is a
legitimate concern."9 However, if retaliation is available as a remedy within the
WTO, it should be a viable remedy not just for some, but for all members.
For reasons previously stated, collective retaliation is a remedy that should
be used sparingly, as a last resort to bring about compliance, and only where
bilateral sanctions alone cannot bring about compliance. As such, this remedy
should be reserved for a dispute involving a significant power imbalance, such as
the one that exists between the U.S. and Antigua. But if the WTO permits the use
of retaliation for some members, then in fairness it should be made available to
all of its members.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article discusses the problem and highlights a variety of solutions to the
problem of developing countries' lack of participation in the WTO dispute
settlement system. Along with these suggestions comes recognition that much
has been written on the subject and that many alternatives exist for improvement
of the DSU. This includes the option of no reforms at all. However, as the WTO
ages, its jurisprudence should increasingly reflect the voices of its developing
country members. Without their presence, the functionality of the entire system
eventually suffers from a lack of consistency. To fill this gap, increased
participation from developing countries is needed through procedural reforms,
which will, in turn, lead to greater legitimacy of the dispute settlement system as
a whole.
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